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COMMENTS
PROPERTY RIGHTS-THE EFFECT OF NOLLAN V.
CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION ON LAND
USE PERMITS: A PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL
ANALYSIS
I. INTRODUCTION
The Hilton Hotel chain won permission last night to build a
26-story slab-shaped addition to its Tenderloin operation on the
condition that it pay more than $1 million to subsidize low-
income housing in the area.'
There is a fine line between what is considered a taking without
just compensation2 and what is considered an exercise of valid police
power by the government in granting permits for development of
real property. No comprehensive analysis exists for determining the
constitutionality of government action involving the use of permit
conditions that mandate performance of a certain activity as a condi-
tion to issuance of a development permit. One frequently imposed
condition is the requirement that a developer either build or provide
funds for low and moderate-income housing.' Thus, when property
owners wish to develop their property in some specific way, a city
may deny a permit to use the property in the desired manner unless
the property owner agrees to either build or supply housing. Nollan
1. Marshal Kilduff, S.F. Planners Allow Hilton To Build Downtown Tower, S.F.
CHRON., Apr. 2, 1982, § 1, at 5.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation"). The Takings Clause applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment of the United States Constitution. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S.
104, 122 (1978).
3. This comment addresses the very narrow topic of housing as a condition imposed on
the issuance of a development permit. There are many other areas of public need that are
targeted by the permit process which are not addressed in this comment: providing garages or
parking facilities, parks, day care centers, transit facilities, etc. Although not addressed here,
the proposed analysis set forth in this comment would be substantially the same when applied
to these other areas, with some minor modifications to account for the specific needs of each
condition.
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v. California Coastal Commission" may have changed the analysis
to be applied in addressing the constitutionality of this practice.'
While the community may clearly compel land owners to bear
costs they impose on the community, there is a temptation to use
permit conditions to impose burdens on property owners that should
be borne by the public.' This is objectionable if the result of such a
practice requires that property owners wishing to obtain permit ap-
proval are required to pay more for public services than those simi-
larly situated (i.e., pay a higher tax). However, because the profit-
ability of any particular project is so closely linked to immediate
construction (and because of the high costs of litigation), there have
been few challenges to these conditions, even those that were appar-
ently unconstitutional.' Furthermore, because courts have tradition-
ally given great deference to government action by applying the ra-
tional basis analysis in this area, there is little guarantee of success
even if the condition is challenged.8 To ensure property owners due
4. 483 U.S. 825 (1987); see infra notes 70-87 and accompanying text for discussion of
Nollan.
5. The issue of whether linkage ordinances, see discussion infra part II.B.3, are consti-
tutional recently worked its way through the federal courts. Commercial Builders of N. Cal. v.
City of Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1997 (1992). In
August 1991, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in a split decision, upheld the constitution-
ality of Sacramento's linkage fees on commercial development to pay for affordable housing.
Id. This case was considered the first important test of developer fees and exactions since
Nollan. The United States Supreme Court recently denied certiorari. However, the issue
continues to be hotly debated and further challenges to the constitutionality of this practice are
expected.
6. The regressive nature of this unequal burden does not stop with the owner of the
land. A developer of property will surely pass on the cost of the condition to future buyers and
tenants of the property. Although this spreads the cost to a larger section of the population, it
still places an unequal burden on some that should be borne by all. "The government may not
seek to impose fees and conditions on the development process merely because the developer
needs a permit and the public sector needs an unrelated public project." John L. Jacobus,
Constitutional Law: Eminent Domain and Conditional Grants of Building Permits-Nollan
v. California Coastal Commission, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987), 11 HARV. J.L. & Pue. POL'Y
265, 271 (1988).
7. Michael H. Crew, Development Agreements After Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), 22 URB. LAW. 23, 39 (1990); see also Charles Siemon,
Who Bears the Cost?, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 115, 125 (1987); Richard F. Babcock,
Forward, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PRODS. 1, 2 (1987).
8. It has been argued that so-called "Development Agreements" are voluntary in nature
and, therefore, do not warrant a cause of action. However, because of the unequal bargaining
power between the government (which has complete control over zoning and permit issuance)
and the developer (who must either accept the condition or be denied the permit), others be-
lieve that those who submit to such an agreement may also be unprotected. See Crew, supra
note 7, at 53; Jerold S. Kayden & Robert Pollard, Linkage Ordinances and Traditional
Exactions Analysis: The Connection Between Office Development and Housing, 50 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 127 (1987). But see Board of County Supervisors v. Sie-Gray Developers,
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process of law when permit issuance is conditioned on performance
of a certain activity, a specific and defined analysis is needed.'
In 1987, the United States Supreme Court opened the door to a
reevaluation of land use regulations when it decided Nollan v. Cali-
fornia Coastal Commission. 0 The main impact of Nollan is in the
area of eminent domain, which occurs when the government takes or
uses private property for public purposes.11 The Nollan Court,
which invalidated a permit condition that was not related to the pur-
pose for the condition, slightly raised the level of scrutiny to be ap-
plied in cases of eminent domain.1"
A broader reading of Nollan, however, may reveal indications
by the Court that due process and equal protection1 analysis should
also be heightened (or at least specifically defined) when a permit
condition mandates that a certain activity take place off the property.
This would occur when a developer is required to build housing at
another location or pay in-lieu fees for housing built at another loca-
tion."' The Nollan decision may be a message to the lower courts to
begin a reevaluation of land use regulation standards."5
The purpose of this comment is to: (1) discuss reasons why the
existing level of low and moderate-income housing has decreased in
recent years; (2) discuss how municipalities have attempted to allevi-
Inc., 334 S.E.2d 542 (Va. 1985) (finding a developer without a valid defense of an otherwise
invalid improvement agreement because he had voluntarily agreed to the permit condition).
Jurisdictions continue to differ on the issue of voluntariness and the issue is usually resolved
on a case-by-case basis. Compare Holmes v. Planning Bd., 433 N.Y.S.2d 587 (App. Div.
1980) with Ayres v. City Council, 207 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1949). Because there are so many other
issues that need to be addressed when discussing voluntary development agreements, e.g., rules
of contract, jurisdictional issues of standing, mootness, and ripeness, these areas will not be
discussed in detail. For purposes of this comment, it is assumed that even voluntary agree-
ments, because of unequal bargaining power, warrant some level of protection.
9. See infra.notes 121-30 and accompanying text.
10. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
11. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 523 (6th ed. 1990).
12. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 841-42. There is disagreement as to whether Nollan changes
the constitutional analysis. Justice Brennan argued that Nollan does not change the analysis
and is only applicable to the facts of the case. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 842-64 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). But see Scalia's response to Brennan in Nollan, 483 U.S. at 840-42.
13. U.S. CONST. amends. V and XIV, § 1. Although the Fifth Amendment does not
specifically mention equal protection, it has been read into that amendment through the use of
due process. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). This comment, while identifying the
equal protection issue, only addresses the issue of whether a higher level of scrutiny is war-
ranted in due process claims against arbitrary permit conditions.
14. Some argue that the takings clause does not only apply to the taking of real prop-
erty, but also to the taking of personal property or money. Therefore, in-lieu payments are a
taking, and not just a deprivation of due process, when they do not relate to the impact of the
project. Siemon, supra note 7, at 126.
15. See discussion infra part IV.
19921 1165
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
ate this problem through the use of conditional permits;" (3) outline
a proposed basic analysis for determining the constitutionality of
permit conditions; and (4) apply the analysis to hypothetical
situations.
The basis for the proposed analysis is that Nollan reveals the
Supreme Court's dissatisfaction with current judicial analysis as ap-
plied to conditional permits. The Nollan Court specifically defined
what the analysis should be when the condition requires physical
occupation of the land.1 7 This comment describes what constitutional
review would look like if the Supreme Court decided to apply the
same analysis to situations where the conditions imposed on permit
issuance did not require physical invasion, but mandated some activ-
ity off the property.
It is not the purpose of this comment to completely re-define
due process analysis. Due process analysis has remained unchanged
since the 1930's, when a series of cases ended the Lochner era of
judicial lawmaking. 8 The Court has since been reluctant to impose
its views on state regulating bodies. From a political and historical
perspective, any change in due process analysis would have far-
reaching ramifications. The proposed analysis merely tries to bring
order and cohesion to an area of law that, prior to Nollan, had no
ordered analysis.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Cuts in Federal Housing and California's Proposition 13
Historically, housing projects were financed through a combina-
tion of long-term debt financing, federal grants, and property taxes.
One reason that cities have recently increased the use of conditional
permits for funding public housing is that there have been drastic
changes in housing finance programs and in the state's tax structure.
Historical sources of money for public projects are no longer
16. For purposes of this comment, "conditional permit" refers to a development permit,
the issuance of which is conditioned on a mandate that the developer either perform or pay in-
lieu fees toward some public activity.
17. See infra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
18. In Lochner v. New York, the Court held that there had to be a real and substantial
relationship between a statute and the goals that it wished to serve. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). The
case was criticized over the next thirty years as impermissible judicial lawmaking. See Ro-
TUNDA ET. AL, 2 TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 15.3
(1986). In the 1930's, a series of cases cut back this high level of analysis to one of rational
basis, which required only that "the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious."
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934); see also United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304
U.S. 144 (1938); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
1166 [Vol. 32
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available.
During the Reagan Administration (1981-88), federal housing
programs were cut by over 70%.9 This has affected city planning in
two direct ways. First, there has been a drastic cut in the amount of
federal money available to cities for their housing programs. Second,
as the existing stock of public housing is taken off the market (and
no new units are put back on the market), affordable housing moves
outside the reach of the poor. Cities are faced with a decreasing
number of housing units, a decreasing amount of money, and an in-
creasing need for funds to accommodate an increasing demand for
public services.2
On top of this, California has been faced with other internal
problems that have made it extremely difficult for cities to collect the
funds needed to address housing problems. On June 6, 1978, Cali-
fornia voters passed through the initiative process Proposition 13,
known as the Jarvis-Gann Initiative." The law imposed new tax
and expenditure limitations that have resulted in less funds for hous-
ing projects.2" The initiative had the effect of "severely restricting the
ability of local government to finance additional activities and in
some cases [has] made it necessary to significantly reduce local public
spending and services. "'2
The effect of reduced federal funds and state tax limitations is
that municipalities must look to alternative means of finance to con-
tinue many city programs. Increasingly through the 1980's, cities,
especially in California, have begun to use conditional permits as a
way to fund these projects.
B. Types of Housing Conditions Placed on Developers
There are basically three ways that cities have placed conditions
on the issuance of a development permit: exactions, impact fees and
linkage. 4
19. 133 CONG. REC. S18, 615-16 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1987) (statement of Sen. Cranston)
(discussing impact of the Reagan Administration on federal housing policy). Furthermore, cut-
backs in non-housing programs, such as welfare and unemployment benefits, have indirectly
contributed to the problem by increasing the demand for low-income housing.
20. Kayden & Pollard, supra note 8, at 127.
21. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA; George Lefcoe & Barney Allison, The Legal Aspects of
Proposition 13: The Amador Valley Case, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 173, 174 (1979).
22. William Fulton, Building and Bargaining in California, CAL. LAW. 37, 38 (Dec.
1984).
23. RICHARD J. DAVIS, PROPOSITION 13 AND ITS CONSEQUENCES FOR PUBLIC MAN-
AGEMENT 79 (Selma J. Mushkin ed., 1979).
24. John J. Delaney et al., The Needs-Nexus Analysis: A Unified Test for Validating
1992] 1167
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1. Exactions
Exactions have been the most common type of condition placed
on developments." The term refers to techniques "employed by local
authorities to compel a developer, either by regulation, negotiation,
or simple leverage, to exchange land, money, materials, or services
for permission to develop.""6 Exactions can be either on-site or off-
site. On-site exactions include improvements on the land such as
sewers, water mains, sidewalks, gas and electrical systems, and
parks. 7 These exactions are generally not controversial because they
usually are closely tied to a need that directly arises from the impact
of the project.2
Off-site exactions are more controversial because they require
improvements located off the property.29 These may include upgrad-
ing or supplying public facilities such as roads, schools and sewage
treatment plants, which have received additional pressures as a result
of the project.3"
2. Impact Fees
The second type of condition is impact fees. Instead of actually
providing a particular service, developers pay fees determined by
formula that apply to all new developments. 1 Cities justify these
fees because, theoretically, they are used to cover costs directly result-
ing from the project.3 2
Shortly after the passage of Proposition 13, cities started using
impact and special assessment fees as a way of funding projects his-
torically paid for by general revenues.3 The problem with impact
fees is that because they are determined by formula, it is very diffi-
cult to know if the fees are being used to finance something created
by the project's impact or used to fund standard public projects not
necessitated by the project's impact. Such fees are often based not on
Subdivision Exactions, User Impact Fees and Linkage, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 139,
139-45 (1987).
25. See Crew, supra note 7, at 24-25.
26. Siemon, supra note 7, at 115 n.2.
27. Crew, supra note 7, at 24; see also R. Marlin Smith, From Subdivision Improve-
ment Requirements to Community Benefit Assessments and Linkage Payments: A Brief His-
tory of Land Development Exactions, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoBs. 5, 7 (1987).
28. Delaney et al., supra note 24, at 139.
29. Crew, supra note 7, at 24.
30. Crew, supra note 7, at 24; Smith, supra note 27, at 7.
31. Crew, supra note 7, at 25.
32. Crew, supra note 7, at 25.
33. Fulton, supra note 22, at 38.
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any impact on the community, but rather on the direct "benefit"
conferred on the property from the fee expenditures. 4 However,
courts have approved of these impact and assessment fees in Califor-
nia and have held that they do not constitute an invalid tax. 8 In
fact, a San Diego fee ordinance was found to be valid even though it
"did not take into account the location of an assessed parcel with
respect to any particular improvement. 38
3. Linkage
The most recent form of exaction developed by cities is linkage,
an extension of the impact fee concept.37 It is often used to promote
social programs and policies.3 8 Linkage ties the right to a permit to a
certain activity.3 9 For example, a city might link the right of a per-
mit for commercial or residential development to the construction or
financing of new housing.4 Large cities, including San Francisco4"
and Boston, 42 were the first to develop these ordinances, but smaller
cities were quick to follow. 43
The problem with linkage ordinances, similar to the problem
with impact fees, is that the requirements are "imposed to offset the
increased housing demand that ... developments presumably would
generate. ' 44 Because certain assumptions are made in calculating
this hypothetical need (and not calculated on a case-by-case basis),
there is a question as to whether these fees are being constitutionally
34. Smith, supra note 27, at 20-22.
35. E.g., Solvang Mun. Improvement Dist. v. Board of Supervisors, 169 Cal. Rptr. 391
(Ct. App. 1980). The court specifically found that such fees are not a tax and therefore do not
come within the tax limitations (mandated by Proposition 13) on ad valorem real property
taxes imposed under Article XIIIA of the California Constitution. Id. at 394-98.
36. J.W. Jones Cos. v. City of San Diego, 203 Cal. Rptr. 580, 587 (Ct. App. 1984).
37. Smith, supra note 27, at 25.
38. Delaney et al., supra note 24, at 140; Kayden & Pollard, supra note 8, at 128-29.
39. Smith, supra note 27, at 25.
40. Smith, supra note 27, at 25.
41. SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., ORDINANCES § 358-85 (1985).
42. BOSTON, MASS., ZONING CODE art. 26 (1983), as amended by BOSTON, MASS.,
ZONING CODE art. 26A (1986).
43. Palo Alto, California has a typical linkage ordinance. PALO ALTO, CAL., CHARTER
AND MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 16.47 (1984); CITY OF PALO ALTO, HOUSING ELEMENT OF THE
COMPREHENSIVE PLAN 1985-2000, PROGRAM 12 (1984). For industrial and commercial de-
velopments, Palo Alto has developed a formula that is based on the "approximation of the
amount of housing necessary" to satisfy the demand created by the average commercial or
industrial development. Ch. 16.47. For residential developments, the builder is given an option
to: (1) make ten percent of the units available at below market rate; (2) provide one off-site
below market rate unit for each nine units developed; or (3) pay an in-lieu fee calculated at
three percent of the market value of the completed project. CITY OF PALO ALTO, supra.
44. Smith, supra note 27, at 25 (emphasis added).
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imposed.
To justify the permit condition, these three restrictions require
different levels of impact on the community. Exactions by their very
nature require a close connection between the impact of the project
and the imposed condition. However, because of the hypothetical na-
ture of impact fees and linkage, the imposed condition may or may
not be connected to the project's impact on the community. Because
of this, some impact fee and linkage ordinances may be constitution-
ally invalid after Nollan."
C. Eminent Domain, Zoning and the Imposition of
Conditions-Analysis and Limitations
1. Eminent Domain
States have the constitutional power to take and use private
land for public purposes, provided they pay just compensation."
Eminent domain cases fall into two broad categories: (1) trespassory
cases and (2) regulatory cases. First, when a state physically tres-
passes on land to administer its public purpose, as is the case when
there is actual condemnation (taking of title) or physical occupation,
there is a "takings per se."'47 There is no balancing of the public
interest against the severity of the loss to determine if compensation
should be paid.4 ' Due to the actual physical entry onto the land,
compensation must be made.
Second, when the state regulates land use, but does not physi-
cally occupy or condemn the property, it may still be required to pay
compensation if a regulatory taking is found. The United States Su-
preme Court has given the states great deference in regulating activ-
ity on property." The Court generally uses a balancing test (balanc-
ing the value to the public against the private harm occasioned by
the regulation) when determining whether a taking has occurred.
When the public value is greater than the private harm, regulations
on land are generally valid notwithstanding a lack of payment of
compensation." For example, any regulatory nuisance control mea-
45. See infra notes 139-46 and accompanying text.
46. See supra note 2.
47. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982) (run-
ning of a cable along the roofs of neighborhood buildings is a takings per se).
48. Id. at 434-35.
49. See infra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
50. Patrick Wiseman, When the End Justifies the Means: Understanding Takings Ju-
risprudence in a Legal System with Integrity, 63 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 433, 440-41 (1988). If
1170 [Vol. 32
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sure is seen to be within a state's police power and not a taking,
because the value to the public strongly outweighs the private
harm. 1 Although a taking is found when regulations have gone too
far, 2 courts have been reluctant to invalidate state action. Regula-
tions have been validated as constitutional police power so long as
they do not destroy an owner's "reasonable investment-backed expec-
tations" or deny an "economically viable use" of the land.5" Courts
have read this broadly to mean that where there is any economic use
left (no matter how diminished), a taking will not be found. 4
States are limited in their ability to assert the power of eminent
domain to actions that substantially advance a legitimate state inter-
est.55 The level of scrutiny applied is one of intermediate scrutiny
requiring that the state has a legitimate state interest and that the
means (taking of property) are substantially related to the end. As
will be discussed below, courts, while stating that they are applying
intermediate scrutiny, traditionally have given states much more def-
the public value outweighs the private harm, then under the Wiseman analysis, there is not a
taking requiring compensation. Id.; see also infra notes 51-54.
51. See, e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (holding that the public
interest in a healthy environment outweighs the private interest of plaintiff to operate a brick
kiln, notwithstanding the fact that he was in the neighborhood first); Miller v. Schoene, 276
U.S. 272 (1928) (holding that the destruction of cedar trees was not a taking because the
survival of apple trees, vital to the local economy, was more important than a private interest
in infested cedar trees.
52. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). An issue that was recently
resolved was the question of whether a government must pay just compensation for a tempo-
rary taking when an ordinance has gone too far and is invalidated. The idea was proposed in
dictum in Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962). The Goldblatt Court stated: "That is
not to say ... that governmental action in the form of regulation cannot be so onerous as to
constitute a taking which constitutionally requires compensation." Id. at 594. The modern
Court again discussed the idea in San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621
(1981). Justice Brennan's dissent proposed that "once a court finds that a police power regula-
tion has effected a 'taking,' the government entity must pay just compensation for the period
commencing on the date the regulation first effected the 'taking,' and ending on the date the
government entity chooses to rescind or otherwise amend the regulation." Id. at 658. The
Court finally resolved the issue in 1987 and held that a government that enacts a regulation
which constitutes a taking must pay just compensation notwithstanding its temporary nature.
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987).
53. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 127, 138 n.36 (1978)
(holding that regulation of land use does not constitute a taking unless it denies the owner all
economic use of the property).
54. See id. at 124-27; see also Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n. v. DeBenedictis, 480
U.S. 470 (1987). The Keystone Court stated: "[W]here an owner possesses a full 'bundle' of
property rights, the destruction of one 'strand' of the bundle is not a taking because the aggre-
gate must be viewed in its entirety." Id. at 497 (quoting Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66
(1979)).
55. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S 825, 841 (1987).
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erence than intermediate scrutiny analysis warrants.56
2. Zoning
Zoning is a justified police power of the state.5" States may
grant to cities and counties the right to zone through enabling stat-
utes.5" The ability to zone allows a city to designate certain parts of
the city for certain uses (e.g., industrial, commercial, and residen-
tial). It is a powerful tool for a city because it allows for the control
of development in light of present needs and future desires.
Because zoning imposes controls on a broad portion of the city,
and usually not on individual land owners, courts review zoning
plans with less scrutiny than plans to take land through eminent
domain. However, due process places some minimal limits on a
state's police power. It requires that the zoning power of the govern-
ment be exercised in a fundamentally fair fashion. 9 Cities are given
great deference and are allowed broad power to zone.60 So long as
the ordinance reasonably relates to a legitimate state interest, it will
be presumed valid06 ' This low level of scrutiny is known as rational
basis analysis.
Zoning issues are important in examining conditional permits
because it is through this power to zone that a city gains its leverage
to place a condition on a particular permit. The city, in granting a
permit, often waives a certain zoning requirement in exchange for
the performance of the condition. If there were no zoning problem,
then the developer would not need a waiver; he would only need to
comply with safety and construction codes. Because of this broad
56. See infra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
57. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). The Court discussed
that zoning ordinances "find their justification in some aspect of the police power, asserted for
the public welfare." Id. at 387.
58. E.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 65800-65912 (West 1983 & Supp. 1992). A typical
enabling statute might state: "Any municipality is hereby authorized and empowered to make,
adopt, amend, extend, add to, or carry out a municipal plan as provided in this act and create
by ordinance a planning commission with the powers and duties herein set forth." DANIEL R.
MANDELKER & ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM, PLANNING AND CONTROL OF LAND DEVELOP-
MENT 26 (3d ed. 1990).
59. Zoning must "bear a substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or
general welfare." Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928) (citing Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926)).
60. Cities rarely give reasons for particular zoning decisions. When challenged, the city
must then, in post hoc fashion, articulate sufficient reasons for the ordinance. The problem
with this system is that with the ability of hindsight the city may rationalize the ordinance to
fit the reason for the condition, even though it may not have been the real reason for the
ordinance. See infra notes 88-89, 149 and accompanying text.
61. Crew, supra note 7, at 41.
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power, localities may have an incentive to over-zone as a way of
extorting conditions from developers.62
3. Conditions on Development Permits
State powers of eminent domain are limited to acts that sub-
stantially advance legitimate state interests, and zoning ordinances
are limited to acts that reasonably relate to the public welfare. How-
ever, courts have been inconsistent in what limits should be placed
on municipalities when they place conditions on a land owner seek-
ing a development permit."'
A minority of states have used the "specifically and uniquely
attributable test," which requires a cause and effect analysis." ' This
test requires that there be a "spatial proximity between the improve-
ment and the property, a correlation between the cost and the prova-
ble benefit, and an improvement capable of being exactly financed or
proportioned."' 5 This test is similar to the intermediate level of scru-
tiny applied in eminent domain cases. However, this high level of
scrutiny is atypical for conditional permit cases.
Most states employ the "reasonable relationship test.""' Cali-
fornia state courts, especially, have been deferential to state interests.
This test requires only that the condition imposed be "reasonably
related" to the proposed development.67 There is a presumption that
the state has valid reasons to impose conditions and it will only be
found invalid if completely arbitrary to the proposed project." Fur-
thermore, California courts have upheld state development conditions
that are reasonably based not only on present needs, but also on pre-
sumed future needs.69 This test is closer to the rational basis analysis
applied in zoning cases.
Although different tests have been applied by lower federal and
62. The Nollan Court stated, in view of the actual conveyance of property as a condi-
tion for the lifting of a restriction, that there is a "heightened risk that the purpose is avoidance
of the compensation requirement, rather than the stated police power objective." Nollan v.
California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S 825, 841 (1987); see also infra note 128.
63. Delaney et al., supra note 24, at 148-56.
64. Delaney et al., supra note 24, at 149-50.
65. Holmes v. Planning Bd., 433 N.Y.S.2d 587, 598 (App. Div. 1980) ("Thus, the need
alleviated must be created solely by the application and the benefit derived must accrue solely
to the assessed property.").
66. Delaney et al., supra note 24, at 148; see also Kayden & Pollard, supra note 8, at
127.
67. Ayres v. City Council, 207 P.2d 1, 8 (Cal. 1949).
68. Id.
69. Associated Home Builders v. City of Walnut Creek, 484 P.2d 606, 614 (Cal. 1971),
appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 878 (1971).
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state courts when conditions are applied to land use permits, the
United States Supreme Court had not indicated what test was ap-
propriate until Nollan.
D. Nollan v. California Coastal Commission
At a time when the number of conditional permits was increas-
ing drastically and the courts were giving decision-makers extreme
deference, the United States Supreme Court granted review and is-
sued an opinion in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission."0
The Nollans owned a parcel of beach front property in Ventura
County, California. 1 They wished to replace a small bungalow on
the property with a house, which required that they obtain a permit
from the California Coastal Commission." The Nollans' property
was bordered on each side by public beaches. 8 The Commission was
concerned that the private Nollan land prohibited access to the two
public beaches. Therefore, the Commission granted the building per-
mit on the condition that the Nollans grant an easement across their
property to allow the public "to pass across a portion of the property
bounded by the mean high tide line on one side, and their seawall on
the other side."'7 4
The Nollans challenged the condition arguing that the "condi-
tion could not be imposed absent evidence that their proposed devel-
opment would have a direct adverse impact on public access to the
beach." 5 The Commission argued that the easement was needed to
assist the public in overcoming a "psychological barrier" created by
the shorefront property inhibiting the public view and access to the
beach." The Court agreed with the Nollans that the permit condi-
tion constituted an impermissible taking.7 7 In the opinion, the Jus-
tices appear to lower the level of deference given to the state and
raise the level of scrutiny used in takings analysis.78
The Scalia majority first reasoned that if the Commission had
required the Nollans to grant an easement, rather than condition the
permit on their agreeing to do so, "we have no doubt there would
70. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
71. Id. at 827.
72. Id. at 828. Under the permit system, the Nollans were required to obtain a permit
from the Coastal Commission before they could legally build on the property. Id.
73. Id. at 827.
74. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 828.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 835.
77. Id. at 831.
78. See infra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
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have been a taking."'7' Even though no particular person or object
would be stationed permanently on the Nollans' property, the Court
found that a public easement was a "permanent physical occupa-
tion" based on the public's right to continuously occupy.8" This con-
stituted a "takings per se". 8'
The Court stated that although certain conditions can validly be
placed on the issuance of a permit, that ability disappears if the con-
dition "utterly fails to further the end adyanced as the justification
for the prohibition. ' 82 The Court discussed this through develop-
ment of a substantial nexus requirement: a nexus must exist between
the condition imposed (means) and the purpose for the imposition
(ends). It found the required nexus lacking in this case.8" Accord-
ingly, an unrelated condition is invalid even if a legitimate state in-
terest is found.84
The Court concluded that a condition would be valid only when
the party imposing the condition could have denied the permit based
on the same objective that the regulation was imposed.85 The Court
stated that "unless the permit condition serves the same governmen-
tal purpose as the development ban, the building restriction is not a
valid regulation of land use but 'an out and out plan of extor-
tion.' "86 The Court reasoned that because the granting of an ease-
79. Nollan, 483 U.S at 831. The Court came to this determination based on the rule in
Loretto that a permanent physical invasion is a takings per se. Loretto v. Teleprompter Man-
hattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S 419, 432-33 (1982).
80. The Nollan Court stated:
We think a "permanent physical occupation" has occurred, for the purposes of
that rule, where individuals are given a permanent and continuous right to pass
to and fro, so that the real property may continuously be traversed, even though
no particular individual is permitted to station himself permanently upon the
premises.
483 U.S. at 832.
81. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
82. Noflan, 483 U.S. at 837.
83. The Court stated that "the lack of nexus between the condition and the original
purpose of the building restriction converts that purpose to something other than what it was."
Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. The Justices split 5-4 in Nollan. The dissent argued that the Coastal Commis-
sion could have denied permission to build due to lack of public access between the two
beaches and that regulating agencies will have little difficulty overcoming the new standard in
the future. Justice Brennan stated: "With respect to the permit condition program in general,
the Commission should have little difficulty in the future in utilizing its expertise to demon-
strate a specific connection between provisions for access and burdens on access produced by
new development." Id. at 862 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Two of the dissenters in Nollan,
Justices William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall, have since retired.
86. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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ment was not even rationally related to the government interest in
restricting development (which was to increase the ability of people
to see the public beach and to reduce "psychological barriers" in us-
ing the beach) it was not in the government's land use power to
condition the Nollans' permit for any of these purposes.8" In other
words, a permit condition that does not secure purposes related to
the permit requirement is invalid.
III. ISSUES
In examining the constitutionality of conditional permits, two
key issues must be resolved. First, what is the standard to be applied
in takings claims? And second, what is the relationship between tak-
ings and due process claims?
One problem with the conditional permit system is that man-
dating a property owner to do some task as a condition to a certain
use may have a greater impact on the value and use of the property
than an actual physical taking. Yet when challenged, a claim that
the condition imposed is unconstitutional traditionally warrants a
lower level of scrutiny. For example, it has been held that the run-
ning of a cable along a property owner's roof is a trespassory tak-
ing. 88 Surely, there is no great private harm or loss of use in this
situation. On the other hand, a linkage ordinance that requires a
land owner to pay money to use his property in a certain way (re-
gardless of impact) creates an inhibition on use of the property and
may significantly decrease the value of the land (due to the restric-
tion on use). However, while the former requires intermediate tak-
ings scrutiny and just compensation, the latter only receives rational
basis due process scrutiny and does not warrant compensation. 9 The
two outcomes are inconsistent in light of the inter-relationship of the
issues. Nollan provides important guidance on both issues.
IV. ANALYSIS OF NOLLAN
A. The Supreme Court Is Serious About the Application of
Intermediate Scrutiny in Takings Cases
With respect to the standard to be applied in takings cases, Nol-
87. Id. at 838-39.
88. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
89. This is because substantive due process in areas of socio-economics traditionally only
warrants rational basis analysis. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144
(1938); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
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lan mandates the use of intermediate scrutiny, rejecting use of a ra-
tional basis due process test favored by the dissent.90 In reaffirming
an intermediate scrutiny standard with some genuine rigor in its
analysis, the Court attempts to clarify the confusion in the lower
courts, unequivocally rejecting the lesser standard favored in some
earlier cases.
The Supreme Court could have reversed the California Court
of Appeal's decision validating the condition summarily by stating
that the proposed condition does not even pass the lowest level of
scrutiny. In fact, the majority stated in reference to the fit between
the condition and the burden: "[W]e find that this case does not meet
even the most untailored standards."91 That alone is basis for rever-
sal, yet the Supreme Court did not stop there. It continued and ex-
plained in detail the proper analysis for takings cases.92 Further-
more, the Court seemed more concerned about conditional permit
abuse than it did with traditional questions of takings analysis.9"
These are indications that the Supreme Court is unhappy with what
lower courts are doing. The Court is using Nollan as a tool to con-
vey its message that the proper test in takings cases is true interme-
diate scrutiny94 and that conditions which lack a sufficient nexus to
the purpose of the ordinance should be declared unconstitutional.9"
B. Indications in Nollan that the Supreme Court May Be Moving
Toward a Higher Level of Scrutiny in Due Process Cases
Concerning Property Rights and Conditional Use
The Nollan opinion suggests that a higher level of scrutiny may
also be appropriate in at least some due process cases. Takings anal-
ysis and due process analysis are closely tied together. Many believe
that they are so intertwined that before one even gets to the takings
analysis, the state must first pass due process analysis.96
Nollan may be the first step by the Court in carving out stronger
90. Justice Brennan stated in dissent: "It is also by now commonplace that this Court's
review of the rationality of a State's exercise of its police power demands only that the State
could rationally have decided that the measure adopted might achieve the State's objective."
Nollan, 483 U.S. at 843 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
91. Id. at 838.
92. See infra notes 101-09 and accompanying text.
93. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831, 837-38, 841.
94. Application of true intermediate scrutiny means that the Court will no longer allow
lower courts to state that they are applying intermediate scrutiny while at the same time al-
lowing the analysis to slip closer and closer to that of rational basis.
95. See infra notes 96-120 and accompanying text.
96. Wiseman, supra note 50, at 440-41.
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rights for property owners. If the Court intends to provide greater
protection to property owners in the future, it can only do so by
addressing both takings and due process. A close look at the opinion
in Nollan shows that the Court may be headed in this direction..
1. Importance of Property Rights
In Nollan, the majority stated:
We view the Fifth Amendment's Property Clause to be more
than a pleading requirement, and compliance with it to be more
than an exercise in cleverness and imagination. As indicated
earlier, our cases describe the condition for abridgment of prop-
erty rights through the police power as a "substantial ad-
vanc[ing]" of a legitimate state interest. We are inclined to be
particularly careful about the adjective where the actual convey-
ance of property is made a condition to the lifting of a land-use
restriction, since in that context there is heightened risk that the
purpose is avoidance of the compensation requirement, rather
than the stated police power objective."7
The Fifth Amendment has two property clauses. One guaran-
tees that an individual will not be deprived of property without due
process of law; the other guarantees that property shall not be taken
for public use without just compensation. 8 Both guarantees apply to
state action through the Fourteenth Amendment. The former clause
is specifically found in the Fourteenth Amendment; the latter clause
is applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause."
While the third sentence of the Nollan passage above is surely
directed at the latter guarantee, the first two sentences could be ap-
plied to either one. The qualification in the third sentence ("[we] are
inclined to be particularly careful ... where the actual conveyance of
property is made a condition to the lifting of a land-use restric-
tion"100) suggests that the first two sentences apply to more than just
eminent domain cases. This shows the concern of the Court that
when a state exercises its police power over use of land, and thus
abridges individual property rights, it must be to substantially ad-
vance a legitimate state interest; mere rational basis is not enough.
If the Court is concerned with the state abusing its police power
97. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 841.
98. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
99. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see supra note 2.
100. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 841.
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to avoid the compensation requirement of the takings clause, it must
be concerned about abridgment of property rights when the police
power is abused in a way that affects the value and use of land (i.e.,
in cases where no conveyance occurs). The potential for abuse in the
conditional permit system is much greater in the latter case because
such claims traditionally have received a lower level of judicial scru-
tiny. Furthermore, because the police power regulation does not
physically invade the property, the injury is less tangible and prop-
erty owners have a more difficult time challenging the state action.
2. Nexus Requirement
The Scalia opinion stated that in order to pass the true interme-
diate level of judicial scrutiny, there had to be a "nexus" between the
condition imposed and the legitimate state interest.'01 By way of
demonstration, the Court gave a hypothetical situation where the
Coastal Commission could have legitimately conditioned the Nollans'
building permit. The Court stated that if the concern was the ability
of the public to see the beach, then the Commission could have man-
dated that the Nollans provide a viewing platform, because that con-
dition would serve the same government purpose as the development
ban. The Court stated:
Although such a requirement, constituting a permanent grant of
continuous access to the property, would have to be considered a
taking if it were not attached to a development permit, the
Commission's assumed power to forbid construction of the
house in order to protect the public's view of the beach must
surely include the power to condition construction upon some
concession by the owner, even a concession of property rights,
that serves the same end.102
The Court stated that "unless the permit condition serves the
same governmental purpose as the development ban, the building re-
striction is not a valid regulation." 10 Any unrelated condition, even
where there is a legitimate state interest, is inadequate to support the
constitutionality of the condition.'"
What the nexus requirement really means is subject to interpre-
101. Id. at 837.
102. Id. at 836 (emphasis added). The Court went on to state: "If a prohibition
designed to accomplish that purpose would be a legitimate exercise of the police power rather
than a taking, it would be strange to conclude that providing the owner an alternative to that
prohibition which accomplishes the same purpose is not." Id. at 836-37.
103. Id. at 837 (emphasis added).
104. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
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tation. The Court does not give a concise definition or rule for ap-
plying this new standard. At the very least it seems to "require some
relationship between the effects of the land use proposed by the
owner and the exaction imposed by the state." ''
The message that emerges from Nollan is that even where the
state has a legitimate interest, conditions cannot be placed on the
issuance of a permit if the permit could not be denied for the same
reason. In other words, a condition can only be placed on a permit
when the governing body would have a right to deny the permit out-
right for the same reason it is requiring the condition." 6 For exam-
ple, if a property owner was asked to provide public housing because
of a demonstrated impact his development will have on housing, the
condition to supply housing would be constitutional under Nollan
because the governing body could have denied the permit outright.
However, if there was a pre-existing need for public housing in the
community (thus establishing a legitimate state interest), a permit
condition should not be imposed on a property owner to supply that
housing unless the development specifically contributed to the need.
If the development did not contribute to the need, a condition to sup-
ply housing should be held unconstitutional under Nollan because
the permit could not have been legitimately denied for that
reason. 
1 0 7
This analysis requires a tighter fit between the permit condition
and the government interests because the condition must further the
same "end advanced as justification for the prohibition." 10 8 It also
means that because of the risk of abuse, less deference will be given
to government decisions and there will be more of a search for the
real government objective."' If the Court is serious about raising the
level of scrutiny in property rights cases, this same analysis should
be applied in cases that do not involve physical invasion.
3. The Meaning of Footnote Four
Footnote four of the Nollan opinion states:
If the Nollans were being singled out to bear the burden of Cal-
ifornia's attempt to remedy these problems, although they had
105. Robert K. Best, The Supreme Court Becomes Serious About Takings Law: Nollan
Sets New Rules for Exactions, 10 ZONING & PLAN. L. REP. 153, 154 (1987).
106. Crew, supra note 7, at 32.
107. See infra part V.
108. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
109. Id. at 840-42.
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not contributed to it more than other coastal landowners, the
State's action, even if otherwise valid, might violate either the
incorporated Takings Clause or the Equal Protection Clause."'
Since the Nollans did not make an equal protection claim, the
Court did not address the issue.' But the note is important in that
it shows that the Court is willing to hear other arguments in deter-
mining the outcome of cases that have been traditionally decided
solely on a takings ground.
Equal protection and due process guarantees are closely related.
Equal protection guarantees that laws will not impermissibly classify
so that people who should be treated the same are treated differently.
Due process guarantees against the arbitrary exercise of government
power. The analysis for these two constitutional guarantees is basi-
cally the same. Both warrant deferential rational relationship scru-
tiny when dealing with social and economic issues... and strict scru-
tiny when a fundamental right is involved."' Property rights have
never been held to be a fundamental right.
The fourth footnote, read in light of the rest of the opinion,
suggests that the Court may be less deferential to government deci-
sions when property rights are at issue. If the Court is willing to
look at property rights differently in equal protection cases, it should
apply a similar standard in due process cases. Since that was not an
issue in the case, the Court went no further than to identify it as
another possible constitutional challenge. This suggests that the
Court is willing to see some changes in property rights cases.
4. Response to Brennan Dissent
Justice Brennan stated that because this case involves a "mere
restriction on its use, '"11 the "State's exercise of its police power de-
mands only that the State 'could rationally have decided' that the
110. Id. at 835 n.4.
111. Id.
112. For an Equal Protection case see Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450
(1988). For a Due Process case see Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). The Nebbia
Court stated: "[DJue process ... demands only that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbi-
trary or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the
object sought to be obtained." Id. at 525.
113. For an Equal Protection case see Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (con-
stitutional fundamental right to interstate migration). For Due Process cases see Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
114. Nolan, 483 U.S. at 848 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Minnesota v. Clo-
ver Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 466 (1981)).
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measure adopted might achieve the State's objective."1 15 He applied
the traditional due process analysis requiring rational basis review.
The majority responded: "To say that the appropriation of a
public easement across a landowner's premises does not constitute
the taking of a property interest but rather . . . 'a mere restriction on
its use,' is to use words in a manner that deprives them of all their
ordinary meaning." ' 6 This show's that the majority was not willing
to allow deviation from true intermediate scrutiny just by claiming
analysis under another constitutional guarantee. Although the major-
ity did state that the opinion does not establish that the standard for
takings cases is the same as for due process or equal protection
claims, 17 the response to Justice Brennan suggests that at least it
will apply the highest level of scrutiny available.
Justice Brennan also argued that the decision does not change
the level of scrutiny at all. He argued that the Commission "should
have little difficulty in the future ... demonstrat[ing] a specific con-
nection between provisions for access and burdens on access.""'
However, the Scalia majority disagreed with Justice Brennan. Jus-
tice Scalia reemphasized the level of review "for abridgment of prop-
erty rights through the police power as a 'substantial advanc[ing]' of
a legitimate state interest.''' 1 When the rights being allegedly in-
fringed upon are property rights, Justice Scalia stated that courts
should look particularly closely to make sure that the condition im-
posed really does substantially advance a legitimate state interest.'20
115. Id. at 843 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery
Co., 449 U.S. 456, 466 (1981)).
116. Id. at 831 (citation omitted).
117. Id. at 834 n.3. The Court stated: "[Our opinions do not establish that these stan-
dards are the same as those applied to due process and equal protection claims." d. The
Court did not address whether a higher level of scrutiny may be available when the issue is not
whether there is a taking, but whether a condition placed on a development permit violates due
process (in which case the intermediate level of scrutiny applied in takings cases may not be
available). It is the purpose of this comment to suggest that the two situations warrant applica-
tion of similar scrutiny.
118. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 862 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan also argued
that the traditional level of review in police power cases was rational relation. He believed that
the Commission had satisfied this level, since the condition was rationally related to the Com-
mission's objective. Id. at 843 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 841.
120. The Court stated:
We are inclined to be particularly careful about the adjective [substantial] where
the actual conveyance of property is made a condition to the lifting of a land-use
restriction, since in that context there is a heightened risk that the purpose is
avoidance of the compensation requirement, rather than the state police power
objective.
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These concerns stated by the Nollan Court indicate sympathy for a
strengthened due process standard in conditional permit cases.
V. PROPOSED ANALYSIS
Because of the lack of consensus and differing views among the
courts as to what analysis should be applied for challenges to permit
conditions, there is a need for an ordered, structured analysis. I pro-
pose that when a condition is placed on a development permit, it
must pass the following six-part analysis to be valid. The proposed
analysis is designed to be applied only when there is a condition
placed on a development permit.121 Subpart 1 comes from traditional
due process analysis. Subparts 2, 3 and 4 are designed in light of
indications in Nollan that the current Supreme Court may be mov-
ing toward greater protection of property rights in cases of condi-
tional permits.1 22 Subparts 5 and 6 are from traditional takings
analysis.
As stated above, the proposed analysis is intended to show what
constitutional review would look like if the Nollan principles were
applied. It does not take into account the many philosophical and
political questions that such a change would raise. 2
A. Proposed Basic Analysis For Permit Conditions
Part I-Due Process Analysis for Conditions Placed on Develop-
ment Permits
Subpart 1-Legitimate State Interest: Does the government
have a legitimate state interest?
-If no, the condition is invalid.
-If yes, go on to Subpart 2.
Subpart 2-Substantial Relationship/ Nexus: Could the gov-
ernment sustain an outright denial of the permit based on the
"same" reason the condition was imposed?12'
121. One reason that warrants this higher level of scrutiny is the threat of government
abuse if the lower level of scrutiny was applied. See supra note 120; infra note 128 and part
VI.B. The proposed analysis is not designed to be applied in other due process claims concern-
ing land use. The approach used here (separating due process and takings issues) is similar to
that taken by Professor Wiseman. Wiseman, supra note 50, at 440-41. However, Professor
Wiseman's analysis applies only to traditional takings claims and does not address the issue of
permit conditions. The six-part proposed analysis in the text is designed to do so.
122. See supra part IV.B.
123. See supra part I. Note that the Nollan majority does not specifically state that this
stricter analysis is warranted in due process cases. The proposed analysis is the author's advo-
cacy of a possible next step given the Court's increased concern for property rights.
124. This Subpart is designed with reference to the "nexus" requirement outlined by
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-If no, the condition is invalid.
-If yes, go on to Subpart 3.
Subpart 3-Reasonable Ordinance: If the reason for justified
permit denial in Subpart 2 is a zoning ordinance, is such ordi-
nance reasonable in its inception and does the condition imposed
on the land owner serve the same governmental purpose as the
ordinance or development ban?
-If no, go on to Subpart 4.
-If yes, the condition is VALID, STOP.125
Subpart 4-mpact: Is the reason for justified permit denial in
Subpart 2 based on the specific impact the proposed develop-
ment will have on the community?
-If no, the condition is invalid.
-If yes, go on to Subpart 5.
Part 2-Takings Analysis for Conditions Placed on Development
Permits
Subpart 5-Trespassory Taking: Does the condition imposed
permanently destroy an essential property right?126
-If yes, there is a taking and the condition is invalid absent
compensation.
-If no, go on to Subpart 6.
Subpart 6-Regulatory Taking: Does the value to the public of
the end outweigh the private harm which results from the
means?
-If no, there is a taking and the condition is invalid absent
compensation.
-If yes, there is no taking and the government condition is
VALID.
The analysis is divided into two parts. Part 1 focuses on due
process issues and will be particularly important when analyzing the
constitutionality of conditions that affect the ability to develop on the
land, but neither require actual trespass onto the land nor perma-
the Nollan Court. Nolan, 483 U.S. at 837; see also supra notes 101-09 and accompanying
text.
125. This Subpart is designed to allow for the imposition of a permit condition based on
reasonable ordinances. As the Court in Nollan stated: "If a prohibition designed to accomplish
that purpose would be a legitimate exercise of the police power rather than a taking, it would
be strange to conclude that providing the owner an alternative to that prohibition which ac-
complishes the same purpose is not." 483 U.S. at 836-37. The requirement of a reasonable
ordinance is designed to prevent municipal governments from over-zoning as a means of man-
dating conditions on permits to land owners. See infra note 128.
126. Professor Wiseman defines these rights as the right to exclude, the right to use, and
the right to dispose. Wiseman, supra note 50, at 454-57.
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nently destroy use of the land. 27 Unlike traditional deferential anal-
ysis, where courts do not look into the reasons the government acted,
the proposed analysis requires courts (under Subparts 2, 3, and 4) to
look at the specific reasons the government placed the condition on
the property owner. Part 1 warrants against the arbitrary applica-
tion of government power in such a way as to force some individuals
alone to bear public burdens that should be borne by the public as a
whole. Subpart 3, in particular, warrants against the government
over-zoning as a means of extorting money or action from land own-
ers through the permit process.' 28
Part 2 focuses on the application of traditional takings analysis
(solidified by the Nollan decision) when the government has passed
Part 1 of the analysis. 29 It warrants against the government taking
private property for public use without just compensation.'80
B. Application of Proposed Analysis
Because there are so few actual claims challenging permit con-
ditions,' 8 ' the basic analysis proposed above will be applied to hypo-
thetical situations designed to take into account all the possible chal-
lenges that a property owner might have against a government that
places a condition on a land use permit.
1. Hypothetical Situation 1: Permit imposes a condition that
housing be built on the property; condition based on direct impact
the development will have on the housing market.
This situation would occur when a property owner wishes to
develop land in a way that would affect the surrounding housing
market. For example, if a developer wanted to build a commercial
complex (bringing more workers to the area) and there were not
enough housing units for the influx of people, the government may
grant the permit on the condition that the developer provide ample
127. See infra parts V.B.3-5.
128. Over-zoning would occur when a city adopts overly restrictive zoning ordinances
solely as a means to be able to place conditions on development permits. Because a valid reason
for permit denial under Subpart 2 is violation of a zoning ordinance, the Subpart 3 require-
ment of reasonableness warrants against use of these over-zoning schemes.
129. See infra part V.B.1-2.
130. Since a condition can only be based on a finding that a sufficient nexus exists
(reasonable ordinance or impact on the community), it will be extremely rare that a condition
which passes Part I of the proposed analysis will fail Part 2. Only extreme government mis-
conduct would warrant finding a condition invalid after it passed Part 1.
131. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
19921 1185
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
housing to accommodate the increased need. This is the case even if
the condition mandates that the housing be placed on the land
owner's property.
Traditionally, this would be seen as a valid condition on a per-
mit because there is a demonstrated impact on the community result-
ing directly from the development. There would be no taking be-
cause the permit condition is substantially related to the government
interest in preserving the existing housing market.
Under the proposed analysis, the condition would also be valid.
There is a legitimate state interest in keeping housing available and
affordable (Subpart 1), and because of the impact on the community
the permit could have been denied for the same reason the condition
was imposed (Subpart 2). If there were a zoning ordinance limiting
commercial development because of its adverse impact on the hous-
ing market, this surely would be seen as reasonable in its inception
(Subpart 3). If there were no such ordinance, denial would be per-
missible because it would be specifically tied to the impact of the
development (Subpart 4).
This would also not be considered a taking. Allowing the per-
mit to be issued would not be considered a deprivation of an essential
property right if the reason for the condition could have been a valid
reason for denial. In fact, the issuance of the permit expands the
property owner's rights, since he did not have a right to build the
proposed project prior to issuance. Thus, Subpart 5 is fulfilled. Sub-
part 6 is fulfilled because the value to the public (amelioration of the
housing pressures caused by the development) outweighs the private
harm of requiring that a part of the property be used for housing.
2. Hypothetical Situation 2: Permit imposes a condition that
housing be built on the property; no demonstrated impact shown.
This situation would occur when a property owner wants to
develop his land in a certain way, but a condition is imposed man-
dating that he provide housing units on the property to help amelio-
rate pre-existing housing pressures. However, the situation differs
from Hypothetical Situation 1 in that there is no demonstration that
the proposed development would have any impact on the housing
market.
Under the traditional analysis, it is unclear whether this condi-
tion would be valid. However, because of the developer's interest in
quick resolution, he usually will submit to the condition just to avoid
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the even higher costs of challenging it.' 3 2
Under the proposed analysis, the condition would be invalid.
Subpart I creates no problem for the government because it has a
legitimate interest based on a pre-existing housing problem. How-
ever, Subparts 2, 3, and 4 create the same problems the Coastal
Commission faced in the condition it imposed in Nollan. Because the
government could not sustain an outright denial of the permit based
on the development's impact on the housing market, it could not im-
pose a condition for that reason. "' As the Nollan Court stated:
"[U]nless the permit condition serves the same governmental purpose
as the development ban, the building restriction is not a valid regula-
tion of land use but 'an out and out plan of extortion.' "-s4
Even if there were a reasonable ordinance banning certain types
of development for purposes of city zoning, "' the government cannot
impose a condition that does not serve the same purpose as the ordi-
nance or the developmental ban. For example, the government could
deny a permit for a high-rise building in the path of an airport based
on a height restriction ordinance. However, this does not mean that
the government may impose any condition for permit issuance. Such
a system would lead to over-zoning for purposes of extortion.1"6 Any
condition placed on a project must serve the same governmental pur-
pose as the development ban (Subpart 3). If requiring housing on
the property does not serve that same purpose (and in the example
above it cannot), then it is an invalid condition. As the Nollan Court
stated: "The evident constitutional propriety disappears, however, if
the condition substituted for the prohibition utterly fails to further
the end advanced as the justification for the prohibition.""'
Surely, the government could validly deny the permit for other
reasons, but it may not impose conditions that are unrelated to the
reason for denial. Subpart 3 acts as a check on the government to
prevent extortion. Furthermore, the condition cannot pass Subpart 4
because the project does not impact the housing market.
132. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
133. It should be noted that the permit could be denied for other valid reasons. How-
ever, no condition can be placed on the permit for a reason that would not warrant outright
denial. Because a permit could not be denied based on the project's adverse impact on the
housing market, a condition mandating that a land owner supply additional housing is not
valid.
134. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (quoting J.E.D.
Associates, Inc. v. Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 14-15 (1981)).
135. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
136. See supra notes 120 and 128.
137. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
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To be sure, if there is a substantial enough interest in providing
housing in the area, the government may mandate that it be built on
someone's property. But to do so, the government must pay just com-
pensation under the takings analysis. As in Nollan, the government
may not avoid the compensation requirement simply by making the
desired activity a part of a permit condition.1"8 Either way it is a
taking, which requires just compensation.
3. Hypothetical Situation 3: Permit imposes a condition that
the developer either build housing "off' the property or provide in-
lieu fees for such housing to be built; condition based on direct
impact the development will have on the housing market.
This situation is very similar to Hypothetical Situation 1. How-
ever, where Hypothetical Situation 1 imposes a condition on the
property, this hypothetical situation imposes a condition off the prop-
erty. The' situation would occur if a property owner wished to use
his land in a certain way and the government imposed a condition on
the permit because of some specific impact the development would
have on the community. For example, if a developer were to build a
commercial building that would have an impact on the surrounding
housing market, the government may condition issuance of the per-
mit on providing ample housing off the property or in-lieu fees to
ameliorate the impact of the project.
Under the proposed analysis, such a condition would be valid.
The government has a legitimate state interest (Subpart 1); the gov-
ernment would be able to sustain outright denial of the permit based
on the adverse impact on the community, which is the same reason
the condition was imposed (Subpart 2); if there were an ordinance
designed specifically to address the need for affordable housing, it
would certainly be reasonable and the condition imposed would serve
the same purpose as the ordinance-to protect affordable housing
(Subpart 3); and even if there were no ordinance, denial of the per-
mit could be justifiably based on the specific impact the proposed
development would have on the community (Subpart 4).
A condition may be placed on a permit as long as it substan-
tially relates to the government interest. Since the interest is afforda-
ble housing, it is reasonable for the government to impose a condi-
tion that the property owner supply housing proportionate to the
impact the development has on the housing market. Any condition
138. Id. at 831, 837.
1188 [Vol. 32
LAND USE PERMITS
that would mandate that the property owner supply more housing or
in-lieu fees than could be shown to result from the impact of the
development would be unconstitutional under the proposed analysis.
4. Hypothetical Situation 4: Permit imposes a condition that
the developer either build housing "off' the property or provide in-
lieu fees for such housing to be built; no demonstrated impact
shown.
This hypothetical situation is very similar to Hypothetical Situ-
ation 2. It requires that the property owner perform some service (in
this case providing housing off the property or in-lieu fees) even
though the proposed use of land has no impact on the housing mar-
ket. The result should also be the same as Hypothetical Situation
2-the condition would be invalid.
For almost the identical reasons stated in Hypothetical Situa-
tion 2, the government cannot get past Subpart 1. Although the gov-
ernment may have a legitimate interest in the housing market, mak-
ing some property owners pay when they have no more contributed
to the problem than any other taxpayer puts an undue burden on
some to ameliorate problems that should be paid for through general
revenues. To impose such a burden would be unconstitutional under
the proposed analysis.
For the same reasons stated in Hypothetical Situation 2, the
government would not be able to pass Subparts 2, 3, and 4 of the
proposed analysis. Because the government would not be able to sus-
tain outright denial of the permit because of an adverse impact on
the housing market (even though it may sustain a denial for other
reasons), there is not a substantial relationship between the govern-
ment interest and the condition imposed on this particular land
owner. Therefore, it cannot impose a condition for that reason. Any
unrelated condition imposed is unconstitutional under the proposed
analysis.
5. Hypothetical Situation 5: Linkage ordinances: developer
must either build or provide in-lieu fees regardless of demonstrated
impact; fee based on a formula.
As stated above, cities have recently enacted linkage ordinances
as a way of addressing the problem of housing.' -However, because
139. See supra notes 37-45 and accompanying text. A recent study named the Califor-
nia cities with the highest office linkage fees (from the highest to the lowest): Berkeley, San
Francisco, Santa Monica, Palo Alto, West Hollywood, San Diego, Menlo Park, Sacramento
19921 1189
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
they are relatively new in land use regulations, linkage ordinances
have not been challenged extensively. For the same reasons as stated
above, developers would rather accept the condition than spend the
time and money to challenge it.'4 ' Many believe that such ordi-
nances are constitutional because they pass traditional scrutiny."'
However, although municipal governments may have good intentions
in wanting to address housing problems, the linkage approach is
flawed under the proposed analysis.
First, this is a per se requirement that all developers must com-
ply with. Because such ordinances rriandate that all developers sup-
ply housing even if their development in no way contributes ad-
versely to the housing market, the only way for a government to pass
Subpart 2 is to argue that it could sustain an outright denial of the
permit if the developer does not agree to comply. Even assuming that
it could pass Subpart 2, Subpart 3 requires that the ordinance be
reasonable and that the condition imposed serve the same govern-
mental purpose as the ordinance or development ban. Any ordinance
that requires one person to pay disproportionately for a public need
is not reasonable, and a condition that a specific developer supply
housing when he has created no adverse impact on housing does not
advance any reasonable justification for the ordinance.
Second, because linkage ordinances are not based on the specific
impact a development will have on the community, conditions im-
posed based on linkage cannot pass Subpart 4.
Third, linkage ordinances completely eliminate any type of
case-by-case analysis. Developers must supply housing, period. Al-
though it is an easy system to administer, it shifts the burden of
funding public housing not only among developers and non-develop-
ers, but among developers themselves. For example, if a specific de-
velopment does not have an impact on the housing market, the devel-
oper is being asked to pay for something historically paid for by
developers and non-developers alike. Furthermore, as among devel-
opers, different projects have different impacts depending on where
they are located and what they will be used for. 4" By use of the
County and Sacramento City. 6 CAL. PLAN. & DEv. REP. 9 (William Fulton ed., Sept. 1991).
140. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
141. One study of linkage ordinances stated: "Linkage ordinances that attempt to match
observable housing need and corresponding price impacts fairly with obligations imposed on
office development should be able to pass muster under the traditional reasonable relationship
test used by courts to analyze development exactions." Kayden & Pollard, supra note 8, at
137.
142. This assumes that it is possible to know the extent of the impact a development
will have on the housing market with some certainty. In many situations the extent of the
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formula, some developers are required to pay for an impact they did
not create, while others pay less than the impact they create. Al-
though it may all even out in the end, it is not a fair system as
applied individually. 143
Fourth, there is no option for a formal, statutory appeal. 14 '
This further moves away from a case-by-case analysis. Under the
current system, a developer pays or forfeits the opportunity to obtain
a permit. This is just the type of extortion that Justice Scalia warned
against in Nollan. 14 Having an opportunity to appeal and be ex-
empted from the ordinance (if it can be in fact proved that the pro-
posed development will not effect the housing market) may bring a
linkage ordinance within the realm of reasonableness required to
pass Subpart 3.4
The argument against linkage ordinances is strongest in the res-
idential development arena where housing developments actually in-
crease housing stock and may decrease housing costs, possibly result-
ing in a positive effect on the housing market. The argument is not
as strong in the industrial-commercial arena. It is easier for a munic-
ipality to show that commercial development will lead to increased
need for housing. However, linkage ordinances imposed on commer-
cial developers still do not take into account where the development
is located, who will be using it, how many people will be using it, or
what it will be used for, among other concerns. Answers to these
questions are needed to determine the impact on the surrounding
housing market. A formal appeal process would accomplish this.
Fifth, certain types of developments will not adversely effect
housing markets. In fact, some may help it. For example, ordinances
linking residential development to a condition that the land owner
supply additional housing may have more of an adverse effect on
the housing market than would no ordinance at all. Simple supply
and demand economics suggest that the more "goods" available, the
lower the price. Thus, when a property owner decides to build hous-
ing units, he is not only adding to the existing stock, but may also be
impact will not be known. However, at least where no impact can be shown with relative
certainty, linkage ordinances should not be applied to such developments.
143. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
144. Usually, the only way for a land owner to challenge the imposition of a linkage fee
is to petition the city council directly. Linkage statutes typically do not include a statutory
appeal process by which the land owner can prove that the proposed development would not
impact the housing market and therefore should be exempted from the mandatory condition
requirement.
145. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987).
146. See infra part VI.C.
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decreasing housing costs on the market. To punish such activity by
mandating that the developer also supply additional housing for pub-
lic use actually works against the purpose of the ordinance. In those
situations where financing a project is very tight,' linkage ordinances
may actually deter the building of additional housing units.
VI. PROPOSALS
A. A Higher Level of Scrutiny Is Required When a Condition Is
Imposed on a Development Permit
The above proposed analysis should be adopted when a condi-
tion is imposed on a development permit. An ordered and structured
analysis is needed to protect property rights in this narrow area that
is so ripe for abuse. When the government has the power to impose
conditions on individual land owners and burden individual parcels
of land, a higher level of scrutiny than mere rational basis is war-
ranted.147 The proposed analysis reaches the needed balance between
the government's interest in being able to regulate land (and ensure
that developments do not create costly community needs) and the de-
veloper's right not to be held disproportionately responsible for pub-
lic projects that were not a result of his development. Governments
will still be able to impose conditions so long as there is a sufficient
demonstration that the government could have otherwise validly de-
nied the permit (i.e., where such denial is based on either a reasona-
ble ordinance or the specific impact the proposed development has on
the community).
The proposed analysis is designed solely to be used when a con-
dition is imposed; no change in the traditional analysis has been sug-
gested for other land use issues.1' 8
B. Cities Must Be Very Specific in Their Legislative Findings and
in Stating Their Purposes for Ordinances
It should not be a sufficient reason for a governing body to put
a permit requirement on a property owner merely because the pro-
posed development does not comply with an ordinance. In order for
147. It is not inconsistent to suggest that traditional zoning analysis would warrant a
lesser level of scrutiny than the level warranted when a condition is imposed on a development
permit. When conditions are imposed, the government is exerting pressure on an individual
parcel of property. The situation which results is much closer to the traditional takings situa-
tion than a traditional zoning situation, where all parcels' within a zone are affected equally.
When an individual parcel is burdened, there is a greater need for protection.
148. See supra notes 121 and 147.
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an ordinance to be the basis for justified permit denial under the
proposed analysis (and thus the basis for imposing a condition), it
must be reasonable (Subpart 3).49 This analysis is hardest to apply
when the city has strict zoning laws and little or no legislative pur-
pose as to why the zoning ordinances were implemented. For exam-
ple, a downtown area may be zoned with certain height restrictions
for many reasons: it may be to relieve traffic congestion, it may be to
accommodate a near-by airport's flight path, or it may be to keep the
commercial space/residential space ratio sufficient to house the pop-
ulation. However, if there is no specific purpose stated for the ordi-
nance, the city is allowed to pick and choose whenever it is faced
with giving a developer a permit. It may condition one permit on
supplying mass transit because traffic management is the reason for
the ordinance, then it may condition another permit on supplying
housing because housing management is the reason for the
ordinance.
If there is no reasonableness requirement, then the city may
over-zone with strict ordinances as a means of extorting money
through the permit process. Such abuse of power should not be al-
lowed. Unless the purpose for an ordinance is sufficiently specific, it
is difficult to know if the condition imposed on a development permit
is really the same as the reason for the ordinance. Specifically stated
purposes and legislative findings are needed so that these determina-
tions can be made.
Because of the potential for abuse, ordinances should no longer
be presumed to be reasonable unless the city states a sufficiently spe-
cific reason and backs it up with factual findings. This will help
courts, in their review of Subpart 3, determine whether the condition
serves the same purpose as the ordinance.
C. Linkage Ordinances Must Allow for Some Case-By-Case
Analysis
Some linkage ordinances do not take into account the specific
impact that the project has on the community. 50 For reasons stated
above, such ordinances unduly burden some more than others. To
make linkage ordinances reasonable under the proposed analysis,
there should be at least some room for inquiry into the specific im-
149. A zoning ordinance may lead to a taking if it does not substantially advance legiti-
mate state interests. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (citing Nectow v.
Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928)).
150. See supra part II.B.3.
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pact of the development project."6
These linkage ordinances do not pass the proposed analysis in
all situations because they lack case-by-case analysis. However, a
few changes would make these ordinances constitutional under the
proposed analysis.
First, it must have a strong legislative finding that a certain
type of development does in fact have an adverse impact on the hous-
ing market. As stated above, this will be easier to show in industrial
and commercial developments than in residential developments.""
The findings should show that in most instances a certain type of
development affects housing in some specific way. For example, that
"x" square feet of commercial development brings in "y" number of
people to the community, requiring "z" number of housing units to
accommodate the impact. To avoid abuse this should be based on
specific findings in the community and not just an estimate.
Second, some stage of the process requires case-by-case analysis.
At the very least, there should be a formal appeal process whereby a
developer could show that his particular development does not have
the impact on the community that the linkage ordinance approxi-
mates it will. Putting the burden of proof on the developer still al-
lows the government the advantage of not having to prove the impact
of each development project while insuring that a developer will not
be responsible for providing housing in situations where he did not
create the need; if the developer does not challenge the condition, the
formula sets the number of units or amount of in-lieu fees to be
paid.
VII. CONCLUSION
There definitely is a need for affordable housing in many parts
of the country. Few would deny that this is true. Most land owners
who wish to develop their land are not unsympathetic to this prob-
lem and are willing to pay their fair share in addressing the need for
public programs. However, land owners should not be asked to pay
for more than their fair share.
151. Municipalities are concerned that these ordinances may be held unconstitutional.
Palo Alto has a severability clause in their linkage ordinance to ensure that if one section is
found unconstitutional the whole ordinance will not be invalidated: "If any provision of this
chapter or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held to be unconstitutional
or to be otherwise invalid by any court of competent jurisdiction, such invalidity shall not
affect other chapter provisions, and clauses of this chapter are declared to be severable." PALO
ALTO, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 16.47.050.
152. See supra part V.B.5.
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Cities around the nation are faced with a Catch-22 situation.
They are faced with decreasing funds and increasing public needs.
An easy way to make up for the lost funds is to ask those who seek
government approval to contribute for these public programs. When
one seeks a development permit that will put a strain on the housing
market, cities have every right to ask the developer to pay for hous-
ing to ameliorate the adverse effects he has created. However, a land
owner who is asked to pay for housing, when his proposed use has
no impact on the housing market, is being asked to bear a public
burden which should be borne by the public as a whole.
Property rights are important and deserve protection. This is
not to say that governments should not have the police power to reg-
ulate land use; they should have that power. Putting conditions on
development projects is an important way to ensure that the develop-
ment will not have an adverse impact on the community that will
later require public funds to ameliorate. Permit conditions are an
important tool for separating general public needs from needs that
are created specifically by developers. Governments need these tools
and should continue to have them available in the future.
Still, governments should not be able to use permit conditions in
a way that unjustly imposes a burden on a few people to pay for
public projects that should be borne by the public. Because of
shrinking public funds in the last decade, the use of permit condi-
tions has continued to spread into areas that have historically been
funded by the public purse. To ensure that some members of society
are not asked to pay a disproportionate amount, the proposal out-
lined above should be adopted.
Andrew P. Valentine
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